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As I understand it, we've been given a broad mandate here to talk about the state of theory in public administration and where it ought to be headed. I'm not exactly a mainstream member of the field so I do this with a bit of trepidation, knowing that what I have to say may not sit well with some of my colleagues. Diversity and debate are healthy in any field, though, and public administration needs a lot of this-and more. It needs coherent theory, rigorous methods, far greater integration into political science-and constructive suggestions about how to accomplish all this. Our aim should be to reinvigorate public administration and see that it advances to the forefront of modem social science.
Obviously, I can't further the cause too much, if at all, in a brief presentation like this. I'll simply talk about an aspect of public administration theory that I think is especially important: the political foundations of bureaucratic organization. The issues have to do with how bureaucracy emerges out of politics, how it gets structured, and how all this shapes its effectiveness. This is clearly a big chunk of what we want to know about bureaucracy. Yet we haven't made much progress over the years, and the reasons, I claim, are due to underlying weaknesses in the field's theory and methods and to its inattention to politics on matters of organization. In the few pages that follow, I'll briefly try to explain why, and what I think we might be able to do about it. (For readers who are interested, these themes are more fully explored in Moe 1991.)
THE DICHOTOMY THAT WOULDN'T DIE
The natural basis for understanding public bureaucracy is organization theory. In the early days, public administration scholars were leaders in the organizations field, and their concerns for understanding and improving government organization were well reflected in its research agenda. They firmly believed, J-PART, 4(1994): 1:17-25 Modem public administration emerged out of a spirited rejection of the politics-administration dichotomy. The insurgents argued that administration is inherently political and must be understood as such. When it came to theory, however, they poured their energies into explaining how the political environment shapes what agencies do in politics-leading, for instance, to theories of capture or subgovernments. While this was certainly an important move, issues of organization were largely shunted aside in the process. They continued to be regarded as nonpolitical and best explained by reference to standard organization theory, which, as political scientists bailed out to study the politics of bureaucracy, was left in the hands of sociologists and social psychologists, whose explanatory interests had nothing to do with politics or government per se.
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Thus, long after the politics-administration dichotomy was declared dead, it lived on in the bifurcated structure of the fieldwith bureaucratic politics understood in one way, bureaucratic organization in another, and no clear connection between the two.
WHY A POLITICAL THEORY OF ORGANIZATION?
The great challenge for public administration is to integrate politics and organization. The fact is, bureaucracy arises out of politics. Decisions about where agencies are located or how they are structured, staffed, and controlled are not made in some objective fashion by organization theorists dedicated to the public good but by politicians and groups who are well aware that the details of organization are often crucial determinants of who gets what in politics. Public bureaucracy is organized as it is because powerful players have incentives to organize it that way. Absent a political theory of organization, all sorts of misconceptions gain currency. Among other things, there is a common tendency to assume that, through sufficient knowledge and appropriate design, we can eventually have the kind of bureaucracy we want: an effective one.
A standard argument, for example, is that independent regulatory commissions are susceptible to capture, so Congress should simply stop creating agencies of this form. Yet this ignores the possibility that those agencies were literally designed to be
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This content downloaded from 152.14. And so for the presidency. Here, a standard argument is that presidents have violated the neutral competence of the bureaucracy by politicizing appointments and pulling important policy issues into the White House for analysis, coordination, and decision. The argument is that presidents should stop doing this, respect neutral competence, and rely more heavily on the bureaucracy. But there is one big problem: Presidents don't want to do this. They are held responsible by a demanding public for virtually everything that happens in government, and they have strong incentives to take control into their own hands. They politicize and centralize because it is advantageous for them to do so. They will stop when their incentives change (Moe 1985) .
Finally, consider an example from a large portion of our public bureaucracy: the public school system. The standard view among education scholars is that schools would perform better if they were smaller, more autonomous, and anchored in a strong sense of community. This is probably true. Yet it also commonly is claimed that these desirable properties can be imposed on schools through appropriate reforms-and there is no theoretical basis for this whatever. The schools did not get the way they are by accident. They are products of a complex system of political control, made up of elected officials, administrators, and interest groups at all levels of government, in which the incentives are stacked in favor of large, bureaucratic schools. Asking the members of this system to create small, autonomous schools with lots of community is like asking members of Congress to stop responding to parochial interests or asking presidents to respect neutral competence. It isn't going to happen, because they have incentives to keep doing what they're doing (Chubb and Moe 1990) .
Some readers may disagree with my jaundiced view of politics. Nevertheless, it is theoretical, and I hope the general problem I'm trying to underline is clear: Many standard beliefs about bureaucratic organization are not grounded in political theory at all. When they aren't, they easily can turn out to be flatly inconsistent with the realities of politics. To make claims and offer reform proposals that make good political sense, we need a political theory of organization.
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The Berkeley Symposium: Plenary Roundtable
THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM
The "new institutionalism" is in the process of bringing this about. For the past ten years or so, scholars throughout the social sciences have put much greater emphasis on the study of institutions, and in political science this has translated into a new emphasis on seeing government institutions as endogenous. Explaining how political institutions emerge and where their formal and informal properties come from has taken center stage as the most exciting focus of work in political science and is clearly spilling over into public administration.
Most of what passes for institutionalism is historical, concerned with the idiosyncracies of time, culture, and personality. This work is fascinating and useful, but it is not theoretical. Two broad approaches to institutional theory-one sociological, one economic-have stirred up the most interest and support among students of political institutions.
The sociological approach is a combination of garbage can theory, popularized by March and Olsen (1976, among many) and the institutional sociology of John Meyer (for example, Meyer and Rowan 1977)
. I'm sure that most readers are familiar with these theories so I won't go into them in any detail. I'll just point out that, whatever else one might think of their provocative accounts of organization-which generally involve ambiguity, randomness, endogenous preferences, symbol, myth, legitimacy, and countless other complexities-the fact is their explanations are not individualistic. That is, they do not account for organizations by reference to the interests or strategies of individuals, nor can they say anything about the coalitions or conflicts or collective action problems that animate politics. Political scientists want to know why political actors do what they do, and the sociological approach is not built to explain these things.
The economic approach is. Rational choice has long been a major theoretical influence within political science-much more so than has sociology-not only because of its great analytic power, but also because it is perfectly suited to provide the kinds of explanations political scientists want. Two branches of positive theory are especially relevant to the study of institutions. The first is social choice, which initially developed as an elaborate, highly sophisticated theory of voting, and then, with the new institutionalism, began exploring the way various aspects of institutions-for example, agenda control, formal decision procedurescondition the outcomes and stability of voting processes. The second is the new economics of organization, which began as an
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The Berkeley Symposium: Plenary Roundtable explicit attempt by economists to explain the basic properties of organization-hierarchy, authority, control, cooperation, compliance, decentralization, and the like-and has since been applied and extended in creative ways to the study of political institutions.
In "The New Economics of Organization" (Moe 1984), I argued that the new economics was likely to prove the single most important development in the study of political institutions. Almost ten years later, I can say that it is more than living up to its promise. It is far more powerful than anything sociologists have to offer. Through its component theories-transaction cost economics, agency theory, and the theory of repeated games-it brings the methodology of economics squarely to bear on organizational issues that until recently were not at all well explained. And because it is largely about bargaining and exchange, it easily extends to politics and, in particular, to political institutions that do not make decisions primarily through voting-most importantly, the bureaucracy. In this way, and in other ways, the organization of bureaucracy came to have a distinctly political explanation. Organization was no longer seen as separate from politics. Its form and content were understood to arise right out of its politics, tangible reflections of the same strategies, interests, and resources that drive the political process more generally. For the first time, really, there was a coherent theoretical foundation fully capable of integrating politics and organization.
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The Berkeley Symposium: Plenary Roundtable As all this was happening, the task, it seemed to me, was to extend this line of theory aggressively to the study of public bureaucracy-and to get students of public administration, who traditionally have not been wildly enthusiastic about positive theory, to recognize the great potential of this work, and indeed to plunge into it, embrace it as their own, and become active contributors. The fact is, most positive theorists don't care much about bureaucracy as a substantive topic of analysis. As theorists, they seek to incorporate it because it's there: new turf, obviously important, that they can conquer. This is mostly to the good. But if bureaucracy is to be well understood, theory needs to be directed and developed by those with a genuine substantive interest in it-the people in public administration.
MY OWN WORK
For the most part, this is the way I see my own work. I have tried to participate actively in this new literature, both as a contributor and as a critic. As a critic, I have argued among other things, that (1) positive theory puts far too much emphasis on Congress and that we need a broader theory of the "politics of structure" that shifts attention from the legislature to the system; (2) presidents, in particular, play an enormously important role in shaping public organization, a role positive theory consistently and misleadingly overlooks; (3) because the new economics is founded on voluntary exchange and gains from trade, applications tend to overlook the coercive potential of public authority and its profound importance for the politics of structure; and (4) there should be greater attention to issues that have long been central to public administration, especially issues of effective organization and good government. I begin with what is essential to politics: the struggle to control and exercise public authority. I then give separate attention to all major players in the politics of structure, not just legislators, and try to show how the basic structure of bureaucracy emerges out of all this, with special attention to issues of effective organization. Along the way, it becomes clear that the political logic that drives the creation and design of American bureaucracy inescapably subverts the prospects for good government (Moe 1989 (Moe , 1990a (Moe , 1990b ; Moe and Wilson forthcoming).
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